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Taxation, Negative Amortization
and Affordable Mortgages
MICHAELS. KNOLL*
Innovative mortgage loans on personal residences that can improve housing
affordability by deferring interest are tax disadvantaged. This Article describes
and quantifies that disadvantage for a variety of deferred-payment mortgages
and argues that the federal government should eliminate the disadvantage.

I. NEGATIVE AMORTIZATION
Home mortgages with negative amortization have received a bad
reputation. 1 Negative amortization, which occurs when the periodic payment
on a debt instrument is less than the accrued interest, refers to an increase in
the outstanding balance between one payment and the next. The outstanding
balance of a loan rises during the period of negative amortization, even though
the borrower is making regular payments, because the accrued but unpaid
interest is added to the outstanding balance of the loan. 2 Although the prospect
of negative amortization sounds scary to sOme people, 3 like a disease tO be

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California. I would like to thank
Dick Craswell, Barry Dubrow, Joe Gyourko, Adam Han~ler, Austin Kelly, George Lefcoe,
Ed McCaffery, Bill Shear, Matt Spitzer, Stephen Seto, Jeff Strnad, and Susan Woodward
for their comments and suggestions. I also benefitted from presenting an earlier version of
this paper at the symposium on innovative financial instruments held at Hofstra University
in 1991. The financial support of the USC Zumberge Research and Innovation Fund is
gratefully acknowledged.
1 See, e.g., John Adams, How to Buy a House; Big Loan Makes Up for Smtdl
Downpayment, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 13, 1991, § H, at 4; Concern Expressed on
Neg Am Loans, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Nov. 26, 1990, at 18; Kenneth Harney, Think
Twice About 'Oreap' Mortgages, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1990, § E, at 1; Diane Henry,
Talking; Negative Amortktztion: Pro & Con, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1982, § 8, at 1; Benny
Kass, Carefol Research Needed Before Committing to an Adjustable-Rate Mortgage, WASH.
PosT, May 4, 1991, § F, at 6 ("[u)nder no circumstances can I recommend the negative
amortization mortgagej.
2 See Wn.UAM BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., REAL EsTATE FINANCE 132, 165-67 (8th ed.
1989); A Mortgage Glossary for Home Buyers, THE WASH. TIMEs, May 1, 1992, § H, at

11.
3 David W. Myers, Your Mortgage; Negative Amortization Slirs Unease, Los ANGELES

TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, § K, at 8 (some housing experts are "downright scared" about
negative amortization mortgages) .

•
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avoided at all costs,4 mortgage instruments with negative amortization can
improve housing affordability in an inflationary environmentS
Since the mid-1960s, when inflation became commonplace in the U.S.
economy, there has been widespread concern with the harmful impact of
inflation on housing affordability, especially on first-time home buyers. 6 In
order to lessen the effect of inflation on the ability of many people to achieve
the American dream of homeownership, a plethora of mortgage instruments
with negative amortization have been developed, 7 and the federal government
has authorized regulated mortgage lenders to make loans in many of these
forms. s Economists, lawyers and housing experts have debated the advantages
and disadvantages to borrowers, lenders and the economy of these various
instruments.9 Throughout this debate it has generally been assumed, either
implicitly or explicitly, that these new mortgage instruments will be treated as
favorably under the federal income tax law as traditional mortgages. 10 This is

4

William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years Of Ineptitude: 7he Need for Mortgage
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and
Loan Transaction, 10 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1190 n.335 (1984) ("Consumers Union takes the
position that negative amortization should be prohibitedj; Don Campbell, 'Negative'
Potential ofMortgages, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1991~-~ 10 ("[t}he moral: avoid [adjustable rate
mortgages] with a negative amortization potential like the plague"); Henry Unger, Don't
Sign a Mortgage Uninformed, ATLANI'AI. & CONST., May 6, 1991, § C, at 1.
5 See Phil Roosevelt, Fannie Mae Supports Loans Lin/red to 6-Month CD Rate, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 28, 1990, at 6 (quoting an official from the Office of Thrift Supervision); see
also discussion infra, especially notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Donald R. Lessard & Franco Mqdigliani, Inflation and the Housing
Market: Problems and Potential Solutions, in NaW MORTGAGE DESIGNS FOR STABLE
HOUSING IN AN INFLATIONARY ENYJRONMENT 13 {Franco Modigliani and Donald Lessard
eds., 1975). Although deferred-payment mortgages can make homeownership more
affordable, their use will have little or no impact on other housing affordability issues, such
as providing shelter for the homeless.
7 See GRANT NELSON & DALE WHrrMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAw 670 (2d ed.
1985).
8Jd.
9 See, e.g., Richard Cohn & Donald R. Lessard, Recent Research on Indexation and
the Housing Market, 31 J. FIN. 403 (1976); Robert Edelstein, Discussion, 31 I. FIN. 443
(1976); Robert Edelstein & Jack Guttentag, Interest Rate Orange Insurance and Rekzted
Proposals to Meet the Needs of Home Buyers and HDTM Mortgage Lenders in an
Iriflationary Environment, in CAPrrAL MARKETs AND THE HOUSING SEcrOR: PERsPECTIVE ON
FINANCIAL RERlRM 191 (Robert M. Buckley et al. eds., 1977); Stanley Iezman, Alternative
Mortgage In.rtruments: Their Effect on Residential Financing, 10 REALEsT. L.J. 3 (1981).
10 See, e.g., Daniel Holland, Tax and Regulatory Problemr Posed by Alternative
. Nonstandard Mortgages, in NEW MORTGAGE DESIGNS FOR STABLE HOUSING IN AN
INFLATIONARY ENYlRONMENT, supra note 6, at 271; Stanley Surrey, Discussion, in NEW
MORTGAGE DESIGNS FOR STABLE HOUSING IN AN INFLATIONARY ENYlRONMENT, supra note
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not the case. Unfortunately, the bias some people have against such deferredpayment mortgages is reflected in the tax law, 11 thereby discouraging everyone
from using them. This Article describes and measures the tax cost of these
alternative mortgages. 12 It also argues that the tax disadvantage associated with
negative amortization should be eliminated.

II. THE Tn...T PROBLEM AND DEFERRED-PAYMENT MORTGAGES
For some time, housing experts have recognized that when inflation is
more than minimal, the traditional, level-payment, fully-amortized mortgage
design increases the real burden of the beginning loan payments. This happens
because inflation forces borrowers to make higher initial payments in order to
compensate for the lower inflation-adjusted value of their later payments. This
acceleration in the real burden of the loan payments is called the tilt problem, 13
and a number of innovative mortgage designs have been proposed that have as
their primary objective improving housing affordability by eliminating the
tilt.14 The object of these instruments is to improve the correlation between the
borrower's nominal income and mortgage payments, thereby improving
housing affordability.

A. Inflation and the Fixed-ROle Mortgage t~FRM")
In order to understand what the designers and proponents of deferredpayment mortgages are trying to accomplish, the best place to begin is with the
traditional 30-year FRM, which first became widespread in the 1930s.

6, at 292; Robert Buckley & John Tuccillo, An Analysis of Nonlevel Payment Mortgages, in
CAPITAL MARKETs AND THE HOUSING SE.crOR: PROSPECI'NES OF FINANCIAL REFoRM,

supra

note 9, at 271; Susan Woodward & David Crowe, A Power-Packed Mortgage, 5
SECONDARY MoRTGAGE MARKETs 2, 7 (Fall 1988). But see Terrence Clauretie & John
Marts, Alte17UIIive Mortgages Have Hidden Costr, 14 REALEsT. REv. 69 (1984).
11 The phrases "deferred-payment mortgages" and "mortgages with negative
amortization" are synonymous. A deferred-payment mortgage is a mortgage on which
netative amortization can occur.
12 An interesting question for further study is whether m"x. considerations are indeed
responsible for the small market share held by deferred-payment home mortgages.
13 See Lessard & Modigliani, supra note 6, at 15-23; Buckley & Tuccillo, supra note
10, at 273-74.
14 Some of these mortgages also address the portfolio lag or term intermediation
problem. This problem arises when the interest rate the borrower pays the lender is locked
in for a long~r time than is the lender's cost of funds. Accordingly, if the lender's cost of
funds rises, as happened in the 1960s and 1970s, the lender will be squeezed between its
high cost of funds and its low return on investment. See NELSON & WHJTMAN, supra note 7,
at 670; Buckley & Tuccillo, supra note l 0, at 273-74.
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Introduced in an era of little or no inflation, the 30-year FRM was designed to
spread the cost of financing a home evenly over several decades.I 5
In an era with little or no inflation, such as the United States experienced in
the twenty years following World War II, the real burden of the FRM
payments is roughly constant over the terms of the mortgage. However, in an
era with even moderate inflation, the FRM no longer spreads the burden
evenly. Instead, the burden of the mortgage payments declines over time at a
rate equal to the rate of inflation.I6
If the effects of inflation were merely to reduce the burden of the mortgage
payments, borrowers would be delighted, although lenders would not. This is
the effect of unanticipated inflation. For example, mortgage loans that
originated during the 1950s and the 1960s were made at very low rates because
inflation was nonexistent or low and because the expectation was that it would
remain so. Consequently, when inflation increased in the 1970s, homeowners
with existing mortgages benefited at the expense of lenders.
When !nflation is anticipated, however, it tends to be incorporated into the
current level of interest rates in order to preserve the lender's real return. Thus,
the higher the level of anticipated inflation, the higher the nominal rate of
interestP Accordingly, because the FRM is structured so that the nominal
payment is constant over the mortgage term, the higher the level of anticipated
inflation, the higher the nominal monthly mortgage payment. Consequently, if
inflation occurs roughly as anticipated, the real value of the payments will
decline, and the present value of the entire stream of payments will be about
the same with inflation as it would have been with the lower interest rate and
no inflation.
An example might be useful. Consider the purchase of a house for
$125,000, with a standard 20% downpayment. The downpayment is $25,000

15 The FRM is a long-term, fully-amortized mortgage. The monthly payment on a

FRM is equal in dollars over the entire mortgage term, with each payment composed partly
of interest and partly of principal. Fully-amortized means that the monthly payment on a
FRM is calculated so that the payments will amortize the principal and pay all interest over
the loan term. See Woodward & Crowe, supra note 10, at 2.
16 Although the real value of the payment declines at the rate of inflation, the real,
after-tax payment will not fall as fast. This is because the principal repayments, which
increase over the term of the FRM, are not deductible. More generally, the after-tax
payments on a FRM are not constant, although the before-tax payments are, because
interest is deductible whereas principal is not. Except at very low levels of inflation, the
smoothing out effects of interest deductibility will be exceeded by the tilt imposed by
inflation.
17 The most straight-forward case of this is the Fisher Effect, which states that each
1 % increase in inflation will result in a 1 % increase in nominal interest rates. The
simulations in part V assume that the Fisher Effect holds.
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and the mortgage loan is $100,000. With no inflation and a real interest rate of
4%, the monthly payment on a 30-year FRM will be $477. Using the lender's
guideline that a borrower's mortgage payments amount to no more than 28%
of pre-tax income, 18 the house can be purchased by someone with an annual
income of as little as $20,460, assuming, of course, that the purchaser had the
$25,000 downpayment. In an environment with anticipated inflation of 6% a
year and a nominal interest rate of 10%, the monthly mortgage payment would
jump to $878. 19 Accordingly, a much higher minimum income of $37,610
would be required to purchase the same house. 2°
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the nominal FRM payment is
higher, the higher the expected level of inflation. However, the effect of
anticipated inflation is not to increase the present value of the anticipated
mortgage payments. To see this, assume that actual inflation equals expected
inflation, in which case the real value of the payments on the 10% FRM will
fall at a rate of 6% a year. Thus, for the last 19 1h years of the mortgage term,
the real value of the monJ!tly payments on the 10% FRM will be below those
on the 4% FRM, even though the nominal payment on the 4% FRM is less
than the nominal payment on the 10% FRM. What has happened is that
inflation has reduced the value of the dollar and therefore the real value of the
mortgage payments. Inflation, which is a gerieral rise in the price level, is
likely to raise income and house prices, making it..~ier for the homeowner to·
meet the mortgage payments and protecting the lender's collateral.21 Thus, the

18 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, at 1n n.3.
19 Although inflation will raise the borrower's income iq the future, relative to both
what it is now and what it would have been without inflation,· the expecation that inflation
will occur in the future is unlikely to rai~ the borrower's current income. See Woodward &
Crowe, surpa note 10, at 3.
20 Two primary underwriting standards are used for home mortgages. The first is the
maximum loan-to-value ratio, which is typically 80% for loans not insured by HUD. The
second is the maximum payment-to-income ratio, which is usually 28% of pre-tax income.
The first standard determines the minimum downpayment; the second, the minimum
income. Hence, the maximum downpayment the borrower can make is one constraint and
her income is the second constraint on the maximum house price. Because both constraints
have to be met, the more binding constraint is determinative-. Accordingly, as inflation rises,
the income constraint becomes more important. This is because expected inflation does not
directly affect house prices and therefore, has little or no impact on the minimum
downpayment, but it does increase the minimum income by raising the interest rates.
21 The real value or burden of the mortgage payment represents the real resources that
could otherwise be consumed if the mortgage payment was not made. Because inflation
tends to increase the price of all goods, the $878 monthly mortgage payment can buy less
each
nie
value of the mortgage payments is most often described as the ratio of
the nominal payment to the consumer price index ("CPij, when the CPI is arbitrarily set
equal to one at the time the mortgage loan is originated.

year.

real
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impact of intlation and the traditional mortgage to increase the real burden of
the mortgage payments in early years and reduce the burden in later years. 22
This acceleration of the burden in the early years (while maintaining the present
value of the burden over the full term) is the tilt problem, and is illustrated by
the downward sloping curve in Figure 1. 23 It arises because the traditional
mortgage design, which keeps the nominal payment constant over the mortgage
term, accelerates the inflation-wmpensation. In effect, each month the
borrower must compensate the lender for the full impact of inflation on the
outstanding loan balance as well as pay the real interest and some of the real
principal. 24 As a result, inflation coupled with the traditional mortgage design

22 The effect of inflation on housing prices and wages is an important issue in the
debate over deferred-payment mortgages. If inflation affects all prices, including homes and
wages equally, then deferred-payment mortgages will not increase defaults relative to
traditional mortgages and no inflation. However, if the effect is more complex, such as if
the nominal prices and wages are sticky downward, then default rates could increase more
from using deferred-payment mortgages than from eliminating inflation. In any event, it is
commonly thought that the use of deferred-payment mortgages will increase defaults in the
current inflationary environment relative 'to what they are with traditional mortgages,
assuming underwriting standards are unchangtl!l, because the smaller early payments with
deferred-payment mortgages will reduce the buyer's equity at every point in time.
However, two kinds of default exist. First, the borrower chooses not to make payments
because it is irrational to do so in light of the relation between the market value of the
property and the size of the outstanding debt; second, the borrower does not have the
income to make the current payments. Although deferred-payment mortgages will increase
the frequency of the first kind of default and the cOSf to lenders, it is uncertain how the latter
kind of default is affected by deferred-payment mortgages, which have smaller payments
during the early years but lar~er payments in the later years. This is because a mortgagor in
payment trouble has two options: sell the property or default. For a given house, a borrower
with traditional mortgage is more likely to run into payment trouble, but is less likely to
default when in trouble because the equity is larger. If the underwriting standards for the
payment-to-income ratio are unchanged and the borrower with a deferred-payment
mortgage purchases a more expensive house so that the payment-to-income ratio is the
same, then the probability of running into payment trouble is initially equal and thereafter
higher with the deferred-payment mortgage. Moreover, given the existence of payment
trouble, the probability of default is higher for the deferred-payment mortgage. Thus, unless
stricter underwriting standards are used, default risk will be increased by deferred-payment
mortgages. Accordingly, the effect on default risk depends on what the underwriting
standards would be for the various deferred-payment mortgages. See Woodward & Crowe,
supra note 10, at 6.
23 Edelstein & Guttentag, surpa note 9, at 193. All tables are located in Appendix, at
pages 1379-83.
- "24 In the above example, the mortgage interest rate jumped from 4% to 10% when
inflation jumped from 0% to 6%. In the absence of inflation, with a 4% interest rate, the
balance outstanding at the end of the first month is $99,855.92. Of the $4TI.42 paid to the
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can put homeownership out of reach for some Americans and require others to
settle for smaller, less expensive homes.
B. Taxonomy of Deferred-Payment Mongages

In order to overcome the effects of the tilt problem on housing
affordability, several different mortgage instruments have been designed that
reduce the nominal payments in the early years of the loan and increase the
nominal payments during the later years. These instruments all use negative
amortization to provide some relief to the mortgagor from the tilt in real
mortgage payments caused by inflation and the traditional mortgage design. So
far, none of these deferred-payment mortgage instruments has made more than
a small inroad into the marketplace. These mortgage instruments include the
graduated-payment mortgage, the constant-payment-factor variable-rate
mortgage, the price-level adjusted mortgage, and the shared appreciation
mortgage. 25

1. Graduated-Payment Mongage ("GPM")
The simplest of the deferred-payment mortgages is the GPM. The GPM is
a fully-amortizing mortgage whose monthly payments increase regularly and by
specified amounts over the term of the mortgage. The increases on a GPM are
specified at the time the mortgage loan is made; they do not depend upon any
contingency. Thus, the borrower knows the full schedule of payments, as well
as the schedule of prepayments that would retire the loan, when the mortgage is
made. 26
'
The most common forms of GPMs have payments
that increase annually
by specified percentage over the first 5 to 10 years of the mortgage loan and
remain constant thereafter. At least in theory, a GPM could be designed that
increased at a constant rate over the entire mortgage term.
lender, $144.08 is a repayment of principal and $333.34 is interest. Assuming actual
inflation equals anticipated inflation of 6% annually (0.5% monthly), the balance
outstanding on the FRM at the end of the first month is $99,955.76. Of the $8n.57 paid to
the lender, $44.24 is principal and $833.33 is interest. Of the $833.33 interest, $333.33 is
compensation for the use of money over the month, and $500 is compensation for the
impact of inflation on the $100,000 loan balance at the start of the month. Thus, with a
FRM, the lender is compensated for the expected impact of inflation on the loan balance
each month when the payment is made.
2S These alternative mortgage instruments do not exhaust those designed to eliminate
the tilt problem. However, most of those left out are similar to the ones discussed.
· 26 Deferred-payment mortgages are of two types: those with planned payment
increases and those with contingent payment increases. Of the various instuments described
in this Article, only the GPM has planned payment increases.
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The GPM was initially conceived as an instrument for young mortgagors
who expected to see their incomes rise in the future. The lower payments allow
the mortgagor to qualify for a larger loan and therefore purchase a larger
house. This could reduce the oft-noted but extremely expensive practice of
trading up, whereby families purchase successively larger and more expensive
homes as their incomes rise.27
The mechanics of a GPM are as follows.28 Consider a $100,000, 30-year
GPM at 8.5% with payments increasing 2.5% annually for 5 years and
remaining level thereafter.2 9 The monthly payment on such a mortgage is $699
in the first year, $717 in the second year, and reaches $791 in the sixth year, in
which it remains as long as the loan is outstanding. Given an interest rate of
8.5% a year, compounded monthly, $708 of interest accrues in the first
month. 30 Thus, there is $9 of negative amortization in that month, which leaves
an unpaid balance of $100,009 after the first month's payment. By the end of
the first year, there is $113 of negative amortization, and the unpaid balance is
$100, 113. Thus i!l the first month of the second year, $709 of interest accrues.
Because the monthly payment of $717 exceeds the accrual of interest by $8, the
outstanding balance by the end of that month will fall to $100,105, and it will
continue to fall over the remaining life of the loan. 3t
Of all the deferred-payment home mortgages, more financial intermediaries
have authority to originate GPMs than any other instrument. GPM loans are
authorized by several of the federal agencies that regulate mortgage lending,
and Congress has authorized the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") to
insure GPMs under Section 245 of the National Housing Act. 32 By regulation,

I

27 These costs include the opportunity cost of not living in the house·· the homeowner
can afford based on her long-~rm income and the transaction costs incurred in moving,

including brokerage commissions.
28 Formulas describing the alternative mortgage instruments discussed in this paper can
be found in the appendix to Richard Cohn & Stanley Fischer, Altenwtive Mortgage
Designs, in NEW MORTGAGE DJ:SIGNS RlR STABLE HOUSING IN AN INFLATIONARY
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 70-73.
29 This example is derived from the one given in Rev. Rul. n-135, 19n-1 C.B. 133,
134.
30 The interest that accrues in the first month is given by the following equation:
(.085/12) x $100,000, which equals $708.33. Because interest is compounded monthly, the
annual interest rate is divided by 12 to arrive at the monthly interest rate. Throughout this
Article, all interest rates assume monthly compounding.
31 Positive amortization or simple amortization occurs when the outstanding balance of
the mortgage is falling because the periodic payment exceeds the , accrued interest.
BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 105.
32 Under § 245(a) of the National Housing Act, the FHA will insure GPMs with the
following scheduled payment increases:
Plan 1-2.5% a year for 5 years

1992)

MORTGAGE TAXATION

13-t9

the Office of Thrift Supervision (''OTS"), formerly the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (''FHLBB"), authorizes federally-chartered savings and loan
associations to originate and hold GPMs. 33 National banks regulated by the
office of the Comptroller of the Currency (''OCC") and federal credit unions
regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (''NCUA") can also
offer GPMs. In essence, the OCC and NCUA have deregulated GPMs, and
their regulations preempt state laws that would limit these lenders as to loan
amount repayment schedule or term. 34
The authority to issue GPMs is not limited to federally-chartered
institutions. In 1982, Congress enacted the Alternative Mortgage Transaction
Parity Act (''Parity Act")35 in order to eliminate inconsistencies between
federal and state regulation of alternative mortgage instruments. The Parity
Act, which does not authorize lenders to originate or hold any particular
mortgage instrument, permits state-chartered lending institutions to originate
and hold the same alternative mortgage instruments as their federal
counterparts. 36 Thus,. for example, state-chartered savings and loan associations
can originate GPMs because federally-chartered savings and loan associations
have the authority to do so. Although the Parity Act preempts more restrictive
state regulation, more permissive state regul~tion is not preempted. States were
given the opportunity to opt out of federal preemption, and several did so
before the opportunity expired in 1985, 'including New York37 arid
Plan 2-5% a year for 5 years
Plan 3-7.5% a year for 5 years
Plan 4-2% a year for 10 years
Plan 5-3% a year for 10 years
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-10 (1988). In addition, the balance of the loan, taking into account the
unpaid interest that is added to the principal, must never exceed 97% of the initial appraised
value of the property. 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.45, 203.436 (1992). The GPM loan permitted by
the Veterans Administration is similar to FHAs Plan 3, for which payments increase at
7.5% a year for 5 years. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4309(e) (1991). The HUD Handbook 4240.2
CHG 2, issued Jan. 29, 1980, contains financial tables for GPMs. See NELSON &
WmTMAN, supra note 7, at 781 n.19.
33 12 C.F.R. § 545.33 (1992). The outstanding balance of the loan may not
exceed 125% of the property's initial appraised value, unless the loan also provides
for payment adjustments every 5 years, beginning no later than the lOth year of the
loan, in an amount sufficient to amoritize the remaining balance over the remaining
term with constant payments. 12 C.F.R. § 545.33(d) (1992). These are not very
restrictive requirements.
34 12 C.F.R Part 34 (OCC) (1992) and 12 C.F.R § 701.21 (NCUA) (1992).
35 Pub. L. No. 97-320 (1982) (enacting 12 U.S.C. §§ 3802(1) et seq.).
36
·
Alternative mortgage instrument is defined very broadly in the Parity Act and
would appear to cover all of the deferred-payment mortgages discussed in this Article.
See 12 U.S.C. § 3802(1) (1982).
37N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 6-g (McKinney 1991).
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Massachusetts. 38 In the discussion that follows, I will describe federallychartered lenders authorized to originate various alternative mortgage
instruments. However, most state-chartered lenders have the same authority.

2. Constam-Paymem-Factor Variable-Rate Mortgage ("CPFVRM")
This mortgage is a variant of the now common adjustable-rate mortgage
("ARM"), which is also referred to as the variable-rate mortgage ("VRM"). 39
As its name implies, the CPFVRM uses two interest rates-an accrual rate and
a payout rate. Interest accrues on a CPFVRM at a nominal rate that reflects
anticipated inflation, but a second lower rate is used to calculate the
mortgagor's monthly payment.40
The CPFVRM addresses both the tilt problem and the portfolio lag
problem. The economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who
designed the CPFVRM recognized that the cost of funds to the financial
intermediary, the interest the intermediary pays on deposits, is the sum of the
risk-free rate, a premium for risk and a premium for inflation. Because this is
the intermediary's cost of funds, it is important for the intermediary to use a
similar interest rate on the mortgage loans it makes (appropriately adjusted for
risk) in order to overcome the portfolio lag problem. However, if interest not
only accrued at this rate, but was also paid out using this rate (which is ·how an
ARM operates), no relief from the tilt problem would be provided to
borrowers. Accordingly, the designers proposed that the interest be paid out
using an interest rate that reflects only the risk-free rate of interest and the risk
premium, but not the inflation premium. As a result, the inflation premium is
paid off over the length of the mortgage, because it gets added to the
outstanding balance as negative amortization. Thus, depending upon the payout
rate that is selected, some· or all of the inflation premium is deferred with the
CPFVRM. This will smooth out the real burden of the mortgagor's payments
and is likely to provide a better match between mortgage payments and income.
The mechanics of a CPFVRM are as follows. Consider a $100,000, 30year CPFVRM with a 4% payout rate and an accrual rate 2% above the current
rate on Treasury Bills, and assume that both the accrual rate and the monthly

38 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 224 (1985).
39 The most successful alternative mortgage instrument, the ARM, does not address
the tilt problem, only the portfolio lag problem. See Woodward & Crowe, supra note 10, at
3. However, ARMs with payment caps also address the tilt problem. These ARMs set a
maximum rate at which the payment can increase, with any difference between the payment
and .accrued interest added to the loan balance as negative amortization. BRUEGGEMAN ET
AL., supra note 2, at 165-67.
40 Lessard & Modigliani, supra note 6, at 29-31; Cohn & Fischer, supra note 28, at
65-67.
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payment are adjusted each month. If the interest rate on Treasury Bills for the
first month is 8%, the accrual rate is 10%, or 0.83% a month. Thus, the
b~ance at the end of the first month when the first payment is made is
$100,830. The payment at the end of the first month is calculated as the
payment on a $100,000, 30-year FRM at 4%, which is $477, leaving a balance
at the start of the month of $100,353. Assuming the index rate drops to 7.5%,
the accrual rate becomes 9.5%, or 0.79% a month, which yields a balance of
$101,146 when the second payment is made. The payment at the end of the
second month is calculated as the payment on a $100,353, 29-year 11-month
FRM at 4%, which is $480, leaving a balance at the start of the third month of
$100,666. This process continues as long as the mortgage is outstanding. 4 1
The broadest grant of authority for the origination of alternative mortgage
instruments is contained in regulations issued by the FHLBB in 1983. These
regulations apply to federally-chartered savings and loan associations, and
through the Parity Act, to most state savings and loan associations. These
regulations seem broad enough to cover the issuance of CPFVRMs.42

3. Price-Level Adjusted l.!ortgage ("PLAM")
The PLAM is the most direct approach of dealing with the tilt problem, ID
contrast to traditional mortgages, the PLAM is designed to keep the real
payment (not the nominal payment) constant. Over time, the nominal payment
rises with inflation, keeping the purchasing power of the payments constant.
Thus, the lender receives its compensation for inflation more slowly with a
PLAM than with a traditional mortgage.
Technically, a PLAM is a mortgage that calls for periodic payments at one
month intervals and adjusts the outstanding balance of the debt each month to
compensate for the impact of iidlation.43 The PLAM also provides for regular
changes in the monthly payment such that the adjusted periodic payments will
fully amortize the outstanding balance of the debt instrument at the stated fixed

41 The CPFVRM is a self-amortizing loan. This means that the mortgage will be fully
paid by the end of a 30-year term without a balloon payment. Accordingly, negative
amortization cannot continue indefinitely.
42 12 C.F.R. § 545.33(e) (1992). These regulations permit federally chartered savings
and loan associations to make loans that provide for deferral of interest and periodically
adjust the interest rate, payment, or balance in accordance with certain indices. The
CPFVRM is authorized so long as the interest rate adjustments correspond to the movement
of an interest rate index. The payment adjustments satisfy the requirement that they relate to
changes in the loan balance.
43 This is likely to be done by indexing the balance to the Department of Labor's
Consumer Price Index, with a lag of several months. See Woodward & Crowe, supra note
10, at 5.
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rate of interest over the remaining term of the mortgage. Because compensation
for inflation is directly built into the PLAM, the stated fixed rate of interest
reflects only the real component of the nominal interest rate.
The mechanics of a PLAM are as follows. Consider a $100,000, 30-year
PLAM at 4%. If the inflation adjustment for the first month is one-half of 1%,
then the balance at the end of the month after the calculation of the inflation
compensation but before the calculation of interest is $100,500. Because the
PLAM accrues real interest of 4%, which is one-third of a percent monthly,
there is an additional accrual of interest of $335, bringing the balance to
$100,835 just prior to the payment. Thus, the total interest that accrues
(0.835%) is the sum of the inflation adjustment (0.5% ), the real interest
(0.333% ), and the product of the inflation adjustment and the real interest
(0.002%). The first payment on the PLAM is $480 and is equal to the payment
on a $100,500, 30-year FRM at 4%. This leaves a balance at the start of the
second month of $100,355. Assume that for the second month the inflation
adjustment is-six-tenths of 1%. Inflation increases the outstanding balance to
$100,957 which with interest becomes $101,294. The second payment on the
PLAM is equal to the payment on a $100,957, 29-year 11-month FRM at 4%.
This comes to $483. The inflation-adjusted value of this second payment is
equal to that of the first payment. The computation process continues as long as
the mortgage is outstanding, and the ihllation-adjusted value of every payment
is equal. The PLAM is illustrated in Figure 2.
The OTS authorizes federally chartered savings and loan associations to
issue PLAMs, 44 and in 1983 Congress authorized the FHA to insure PLAMs.
No other federal agency has explicitly authorized PLAMs. 45 However, the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urbal} Development ("HUD") has been
working on a pilot program for PLAMS with FHA insurance. 46 Thus far,
HUD has not implememed its pilot program.

44 12 C.F.R. § 545.33(e)(2) (1992) (adjustments to payment and loan balance based on
an inflation index are permissible).
45 Until 1983, the enforceability of PLAMs was in doubt. In Aztec Properties, Inc. v.
Union Planters National Bank, 530 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1975), cert. tknied, 425 U.S. 975
(1976), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that inflation-indexation violated the 1933 Gold
Clause, which prohibited requiring payment in a particular form of currency or coin other
tha}l the U.S. dollar. In 1983, Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5118(d)(2), which effectively
repealed the Gold Clause, removing any doubts about the enforceability of contracts with
inflation-indexation clauses.
46 See Woodward & Crowe, supra note 10, at 5.
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4. Shared Appreciation Mortgage ("SAM")
-The SAM, sometimes called a participation mortgage, pays periodic
interest at a fixed or variable rate lower than the market rate of interest. In
order to compensate the lender for the lower stated interest, the lender also
receives a stated percentage of the increase in the value of the property when
the borrower transfers or refinances the real estate or at a specified date,
whichever occurs first. This second interest component is called the shared
appreciation provision, or the equity kicker. From the borrower's viewpoint,
the advantage of the SAM is the lower monthly payment. This allows the
borrower to qualify for a larger loan and thereby purchase a larger and more
expensive house. 47
An example of how a SAM works follows. Consider the purchase of a
house for $125,000 using a $100,000, 10-year SAM at 6% that calls for the
lender to receive 40% of the appreciation and uses a 30-year amortization
schedule. The monthly-payment on the SAM is equal to that of a $100,000, 30year FRM at 6%, which is $600. Assume that the house is sold at the end of 8
years for $165,000. The appreciation is $40,000, and the lender receives 40%
of this, $16,000, as interest by virtue_ of the shared appreciation provision. The
outstanding balance on the loan when the property is sold is $91,018, which
the lender receives upon sale as a repayment
principal. Thtis, the original
owner receives $57,982, which includes $24,000 profit and $33,982 as a return
of capital. The latter includes the $25,000 downpayment and $8982 of equity
from the principal repayment during the 8 years.
The OTS is the only major regulatory agency explicitly authorizing
SAMs.48

of

~

ill.

TAXATION OF DEFERRED-PAYMENT MORTGAGES

Home mortgages with negative amortization are tax disadvantaged because
federal tax law requires that the lender include the interest in its income as it
accrues, but prevents the borrower from deducting the interest from her income
until she actually pays it. As their name implies, deferred-payment mortgages
defer some of their interest, that is, accrue interest before paying it out, thereby
causing the lender's inclusions to run ahead of the borrower's deductions.

47 ~e generally, Ronald Friend, Shared Appreciation Mortgages, 34 HAsTINGS L.J.
331 {1982). 48 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(b)(3) (1992) (federal savings and loan associations can receive a
portion of their compensation for making a loan in the form of a percentage of the amount
by which the market value of the property has appreciated).
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A. Taxation Generally
Negative amortization on home mortgages raises three basic tax issues: the
timing of interest inclusions and deductions; the allocation of payments between
interest and recovery of principal; and the characterization of negative
amortization as acquisition indebtedness or home equity indebtedness.

1. Timing
The Tax Code draws a distinction between two kinds of interest-qualified
periodic interest payments ("QPIP") and original issue discount ("OlD"). QPIP
is defined as interest payments made at regular intervals that are the product of
the outstanding balance of the loan at the beginning of an accrual period and a
fixed rate of interest or a variable rate of interest that is tied to an objective
interest index ("qualified variable rate"). 49 QPIP payments are accounted for
by the borrower and the lender at the time of payment. so
OlD refers to all payments of interest other than QPIP.s1 OlD is pervasive,
and elaborate rules have been developed to deal with the treatment of OlD,
especially with the timing of OID.5 2 The impact of these rules is to place all
parties to a loan transaction, regardless of whether they use the cash or the
accrual method of accounting, on the accrual method with respect to a loan. 53

49 Prop. Treas. Reg.§ l.l273-1(b)(2)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1986).

SO I.R.C. §§ 61, 163(a) (1986). This is true for taxpayers who use the case
disbursements and receipts method of accounting or the accrual method of accounting.
Because QPIP payments are made as they accrue, it makes little difference whether they are
taxed as they are paid or accrued.
5 1 OlD can exist in a wide variety of loan transactions, including an instrument issued
for less than face value, the payment of points on a loan, a debt instrument that pays
multiple rates of interest, or a debt instrument when the total amount of interest is
contingent upon the happening of some future event or events, such as inflation, the dollarmark exchange rate, or an index of house prices. See David P. Hariton, The Taxation of
ComplexFinandal Instruments, 43 TAXL. REv. 731 (1988).
52 The OID rules are contained in I.R.C. §§ 1271 through 1275 and the accompanying
proposed and temporary regulations, which the Treasurey Department originally issued in
April 1986 and has since amended. The regulations were first released in 51 Fed. Reg.
12,022, 12,022-97 (1986). Three useful descriptions of these very complex regulations are
DAVID GARLOCK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE ORIGINAL IssUE DISCOUNT .REGuLATIONS

(1988); Lawrence Lokken, The Tune Value ofMoney Rules, 42 TAXL. REv. 1 (1986); Noel
·Cunningham & Deborah Schenk, Coping with Original Issue Discount (N.Y.U. School of
Law mimeograph) (1986).
53 There are exceptions to these rules for short-term loans and for small dollar
amounts.
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Accordingly, the OlD rules would generally require that the parties account for
the OlD on a home mortgage as it accrues.
This, however, is not the whole story for most deferred-payment home
mortgages. A provision in the Tax Code known as t~Je personal use exception,
section l275(b), provides that an individual who has incurred a debt to
purchase or carry personal use property, which includes a personal residence, 54
cannot deduct the OlD that has accrued until it has been paid.ss It is this
provision, in concert with the rules for when OlD accrues, that results in the
tax disadvantage to deferred-payment mortgages. For it is the personal use
exception that defers borrowers' deductions, thereby causing the mismatching
of lenders' inclusions and borrowers' deductions. 56

2. Interest Stacking Rule
Interest stacking refers to the allocation of payments between interest and
principal. Accordingly, the interest stacking rule determines not only the timing
of the interest inclusions and deductions but also the amortization schedule. The
OlD rules establish a two-step procedure for allocating a payment between
principal and interest. First, the payment's. of QPIP, which are always interest,
must be identified. Next, the remaining payments are then divided between
OlD and principal. The OlD rules treat apayment as first coming out of
accrued but unpaid OlD. To the extent that the non-QPIP portion of a payment
exceeds the amount of accrued OlD, the rest of the payment is treated as a
repayment of principal.5 7 If the payment is less than the sum of the QPIP and
the accrued OlD, then no portion of the payment is allocated to principal. In
this case, the outstanding balance will have increased between the current
period and the previous period. Thus, when there is negative amortization, the
entire payment is interest. Additionally, the payment of previous negative

54 Personal use property is defined as property substantially all of the use of which by
the taxpayer is not in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business or for the production
of income. Prop. Tres. Reg. § 1.1275-2(f){3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1986).
55 I.R.C. § 1275(b); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-2(f), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1986).
56 My USC colleague, George Lefcoe, suggests that the deferral of deduction might
help homeowners budget their finances over time. Deferring the tax deduction until
payment gives owners the deduction when they are likely to need it most-when they make
the corresponding mortgage payment. If the deduction were available when the interest
accrued, some homeowners might be led to believe that they could afford a more expensive
house based on their current after-tax income than they can actually afford over the
mortgage term. Although the deferral might help some homeowners balance their finances,
this assistance is available only at the cost of increasing the present value of the after-tax
payments of all homeowners with deferred-payment mortgages.
~7 Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1272-l(e)(2)(ti), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1986).
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amortization is always treated as coming out of accrued and previously unpaid
OID.

3. Characterizalion of Indebtedness
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, personal interest is not
generally deductible. An exception to this rule is that interest paid on qualified
residence indebtedness is deductible. Qualified residence indebtedness
comprises acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness.
Acquisition indebtedness is any indebtedness incurred in acquiring,
constructing, or substantially improving a taxpayer's residence that is secured
by that residence. 58 Home equity indebtedness is any indebtedness other than
acquisition indebtedness secured by the taxpayer's residence. 59 Acquisition
indebtedness is subject to a maximum of $1 million, whereas home equity
indebtedness is limited to $100,000. 60 In addition, acquisition indebtedness is
limited to the cost of constructing or purchasing the residence, including the
cost of improvements. 61
The characterization issue raised by deferred-payment mortgages is
whether the negative amortization on these mortgages can be treated as home
acquisition indebtedness or whether it must be treated as home equity
indebtedness, which is subject to a lower cap. In recently released regulations,
the Treasury Department has stated that interest that accrues on acquisition
indebtedness will be treated as acquisition indebtedness, and such negative
amortization is not subject to the restriction that acquisition indebtedness is
limited by the cost of acquiring and improving the property. 62 However, the $1
million limitation on acquisition indebteqness still applies and thus, could limit
the deductibility of interest that accrues on negative amortization. 63
The treatment of negative amortization as acquisition indebtedness is
favorable to taxpayers and removes one possible tax impediment to deferredpayment mortgages. If the negative amortization were not treated as acquisition
indebtedness, purchasers of houses in the several hundred thousand dollar price
range who selected deferred-payment mortgages would have seen a
disallowance of substantial interest deductions had inflation continued at its

58 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B) (1986).
59 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(q (1986) (mdebtedness not secured by a residence is not
qualified residence indebtedness regardless of the use to which the loan proceeds are put).
60 I.R.C. § 163(h) (1986).

61 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(l) (1986).
62 Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.163-llT(b) (1990).
63 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-llT(d) (1990), Example 2(Ii). Although several
provisions in the tax code are indexed for inflation, the $1 million limitation on home
acquisition indebtedness is not.
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recent level. This could have significantly increased the tax cost of deferredpayment mortgages to these taxpayers.6 4

B. Applicarion to Specific Mortgages
A technical discussion of the tax treatment of the various types of deferredpayment mortgages follows, with an emphasis on the tax disadvantage. In
general, the tax disadvantage stems from the timing of the interest accruals and
the personal use exception, which together operate to deter the mortgagor's
interest deductions relative to the mortgagee's interest inclusions when there is
negative amortization.65

I. GPM
Under the OlD rules, all of the payments on a GPM are discounted such
that the present value of the payments equals the initial loan principal. The
internal rate of return that equates the present value of the payments and the
loan principal is the yield to maturity ("YTM") on the mortgage loan. The
product of the monthly YTM and the original loan principal (also called the
issue price) is the interest that accrues in the first month. The mortgage
payment made at the end of the first month' is treated as interest up to the
amount of interest that accrues and thereafter as a return of principal. The sum
of the original loan principal and the interest that accrued in the first month less
the interest that was paid in that month is the adjusted issm~ price ("AlP") of
the note. The product of the AIP and YTM is the interest lhat accrues in the
second month. The same formula applies in all f<;>llowing months; over time,
AlP changes, but YTM is constant.
·

64 What is likely to be less well appreciated is that this favorable view might set up an
additional tax arbitrage possibility for borrowers with deferred-payment: mortgages over and
above that which is available with traditional mortgages. The possibility arises because a
homeowner can in effect deduct the interest she pays on the money she borrows to invest in
bonds that produce interest exempt from tax or in equities that defer gain for tax purposes.
This is the same arbitrage possibility, although to a lesser degree, that a cash-rich purchaser
of a house faces. Such a purchaser can pay cash for the house or take a mortgage and invest
the cash in tax-exempt or tax-<leferred instruments. If she does the latter, she is in effect
deducting the interest borrowed on funds used to finance tax-favored investments. Under
reasonable assumptions, the tax benefit from this arbitrage possibility is overshadowed by
th~ tax cost _of the personal use exception.
65 ARMs with payment caps can produce negative amortization. This negative
amortization results in the same tax disadvantage that other deferred··payment mortgages
exhibit.
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As long as there is more than a minimal amount of graduation, a GPM will
produce negative amortization in the early years. Because the personal use
exception denies the taxpayer a deduction for interest that has accrued but has
not yet been paid, this deferred interest will not be deductible by the borrower
until it is paid.· The interest will, however, be included by the lender as it
accrues. Thus, the borrower's interest deductions (bUit not the lender's interest
inclusions) are deferred by using a GPM relative to a mortgage without
negative amortization.66
Applying these rules to the $100,000 GPM at 8.5% with payments
increasing by 2.5% annually for 5 years described in section II.B.1, the issue
price is $100,000 and the YTM is 8.5%. Thus, in the first month, $708
interest will accrue and will be included by the lender; the interest stacking rule
implies that the payment of $699 will come out of accrued interest and will
therefore be currently deductible by the borrower. Thus, the AlP at the end of
the first month is $100,009. By the end of the first year, the lender will have
inclusions of .$8503, and the borrower will have deductions of $8390; the
difference of $113 represents the negative amortization of the loan over the
year and is the source of the tax cost. Thus, at the end of the first year, the AlP
is $100,113. In the first month of the second year, $709 of interest accrues and
is included by the lender. At the end of that month, tht~ borrower pays $717, all
of which is then deductible. In effect, the borrower is paying the interest that
currently accrues plus $8 of interest that accrued in year 1. It will take the
borrower until early in year 3 to pay all of the interest that accrued in year 1.

2. CPFVRM
' rate is a qualified variable rate.
Under the OlD rules, the payout interest
Accordingly, the product of the payout rate and the AlP at the beginning of the
month is treated as QPIP;67 it is deductible by the borrower and includible by
the lender when it is paid, which is also when it accrues. The interest that
accrues but is not treated as QPIP is classified as OlD. The excess of the
interest that accrues each month over the interest that is paid (both QPIP and
accrued OlD) is added to the AlP of the loan each month to get the AlP at the
beginning of the following month. If the payment exceeds the accrued interest,
which will happen towards the end of the mortgage term even with high rates
of inflation, the excess reduces the AlP.
Applying these rules to the $100,000 30-year CPFVRM with a 4% payout
rate and an accrual rate 2% above the current rate on Treasury Bills described

66 The application of the OID rules to a GPM produces the same tax consequences for
borrowers and lenders that was described in Rev. Rul. 77-135, 1977-1 C.B. 133.
67 See supra part ll.A.1.
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in section II.B.2, the 4% payout rate is a qualified variable rate. Accordingly,
$333 of the $477 payment at the end of the first month is QPIP, included by
the lender and deducted by the borrower when paid. The difference between
the interest t: , accrues in the first month ($830) and the QPIP ($333) is OlD
($497). The $497 of OlD that accrues in the first month is included in the
lender's taxable income, but by virtue of the personal use exception, it cannot
be deducted by the borrower until it is actually paid. The borrower's payment
in the first month ($477) exceeds the amount of QPIP by $144. Because the
accrued OlD ($497) exceeds the non-QPIP portion of the payment, the interest
stacking rule implies that the entire $144 is treated as coming out of accrued
OlD, and it is therefore currently deductible. Thus, the AlP at the start of the
second month is $100,353, and the lender's inclusion in the first month exceeds
the borrower's deduction in that month by $353.

3. PLAM
The tax treatment ofPLAMs was clarified in 1990 when the U.S. Treasury
Department issued proposed and temporary regulations covering the taxation of
PLAMs. 6 8 According to the Treasury, although in form a PLAM is a debt
instrument with a fixed rate of interest and a principal balance that is adjusted
monthly for inflation, it is economically equivalent to a debt instrument with a
fixed pri!1cipal balance and a variable rate of interest that changes monthly.
Accordingly, the recently introduced regulations were modeled after the
qualified variable rate rules, which were described in connection with the
CPFVRM. The regulations treat a PLAM as accruing interest at a rate that is
the sum of the real interest rate, the inflation rate and the product of the real
interest and inflation rates. The real interest rate is treated as the payout rate.
Applying these rules to the $100,000, 30-year PLAM described in section
II.B.3, the accrual rate in the first month is 0.835, which is the sum of the
inflation rate, the contract interest rate and the product of the two. The 4%
contract interest rate is a fixed interest rate. Thus, the interest that accrues in
the first month is $835. Of this amount, $333 ($100,000 x 0.00333) is QPIP,
which means that $502 of OlD accrues in the first month and is included in the
lender's income. The first payment ($480) exceeds the amount of QPIP ($333)
by $147. Because this is less than the amount of accrued OlD ($502), the entire
$147 is treated as a payment of accrued OlD and is therefore currently
deductible by the borrower. The tax disadvantage arises because the accrued
but unpaid OlD, $355, is currently includible by the lender but, by virtue of
the personal use exception, is not currently deductible by the borrower. The
AlP at the start of the second month is $100,355, which is also the outstanding
I

68 T.D. 8281, 1990-1 C.B. 37.
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balance. Thus, the interest that accrues in the second month (assuming inflation
is six-tenths of I%) is $939 and the QPIP payment is $335. Hence, the OlD
accrual in the second month is $604. The second payment is $483, of which
$335 is a payment of QPIP, leaving $148. The amount of accrued but unpaid
OlD prior to the second payment is $960. Thus, the entire $149 payment
comes out of accrued OlD, making it currently deductible by the borrower.
Thus, the AlP at the start of the third month is $100,8l2. The calculations in
succeeding months proceed in the same manner.69

4.SAM
The tax treatment of the SAM is significantly different than the tax
treatment of the other deferred-payment mortgages. With the other deferredpayment mortgages, interest accrues for tax purposes as it accrues
economically. However, with the SAM, the recognition of interest is deferred
until payment. This is because the contingent interest is a function of the price
of the property, which as recent history demonstrates, can fall. The possibility
of the price falling implies that the contingent interest might ultimately be less
than that which has accrued based on the current market value. Because of this
possibility, the contingent interest is not recognized as the house appreciates but
only upon payment.7° Accordingly, although the borrower's deductions are

69 Huston McCulloch argues that PLAMs would not be

tax disadvantaged relative to
traditional mortgages even if the borrower could not deduct accrued interest until payment.
According to McCulloch, there would be no disadvantage because the borrower could
always make a partial prepayment of the accrued interest and receive a current deduction.
Thus, if the borrower chooses not to prepay' it must be because she is better off having the
additional cash today even though her tax liability is larger. See I. Huston McCulloch,
PLAMs:.Affordable Mortgages from Inflation-Proof Deposits, F.H. L.B. CIN. Q. REP. 1982
at 2, 7. Leaving to one side the issue of whether borrowers would have a right to make
penalty-free prepayments of all or part of the accrued OlD, McCulloch does not appear to
dispute the tax cost of reducing the tilt problem by deferring intere.'ot using a PLAM.
70 In 1991, the Treasury Department issued a revised version of Proposed Treasury
Regulation §1.1275-4, describing the tax treatment of debt instruments calling for
contingent payments. 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 (1991). The new proposed regulation applies to
debt instruments that provide for noncontingent payments at least equal to the issue price of
the instrument and for contingent payments that are determined by reference to the value of
publicly traded property. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-S(g), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1986).
Accordingly, the amendments would not apply to SAMs for two reasons. First, SAMs do
not have to provide for noncontingent payments at least equal to the amount borrowed.
. Second,_ the contingent payments of all SAMs are a function of thl~ value of the mortgaged
house, which is not publicly traded property. For a discussion of the amendments to the
proposed regulation, which has the effect of bifurcating a covere.d-debt instrument into a
straight-debt instrument and other property, see David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating
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deferred with a SAM, the lender's inclusions are also deferred; thus, there is
no mismatching between deductions and inclusions.
In 1983, the Treasury issued guidance on the tax treatment of homeowners
with SAMs. Revenue Ruling 83-51 provides that the homeowner can deduct
the contingent interest on a SAM when the contingent interest is paid. The
treatment on the lender's side is the same, although the authority comes from
the OlD rules. The OlD rules provide that OlD is recognized when it becomes
fixed, which is when its floor can be reasonably ascertained_?! Because there is
the possibility that previously accrued contingent interest will be eliminated by
a fall in price, there is no recognition until repayment for the lender. n
The deferral of both the borrower's interest deductions and the lender's
interest inclusions with a SAM creates the possibility of a tax benefit to the
parties from using a SAM. If the lender's marginal! tax rate exceeds the
borrower's, there is a tax savings from using a SAM instead of a traditional
mortgage. Because the corporate marginal tax rate is 34%, whereas many
homeowners are likely to have marginal tax rates of 28 or 31%,73 there is the
possibility of some tax savings from the use of SAMs. 74 Such a savings,
however is contingent upon the individual taxpayer being able to use the entire
interest deduction in the year it is paid, and without reducing her marginal tax
rate significant! y.
Returning to the $100,000 SAM descr.ibed in section II.B.4, the property is
purchased for $125,000 using a SAM that calls for 6% interest, a 30-year
amortization schedule, and gives the lender 40% of the appreciation as
compensation for the below-market interest. The monthly payment is $600 and
the property is sold after 8 years for $165,000. Th~~ monthly payment is
divided between principal and interest on the same basis as the corresponding
FRM.75 None of the appreciation is subject'to tax until it is realized, which
occurs in the eighth year when the property is sold. As a result of the shared
appreciation provision, the lender receives $16,000. This amount is includible

Contingent Debt-A Mistake?, 51 TAX NOTES 235 (1991); Lawrence Lokken, New Rules
Bijurcaring Contingent Debt-A Good Start, 51 TAX NOTES 495 (1991).
71 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1275-5, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1986).
72 See 9 U.S. Tax Rep. (RIA) 1 8564.08 (Aug. 27, 1992) (treatment of REIT income
from a shared appreciation provision).
73 For a discussion of individual federal marginal income tax rates following the
Revenue and Reconciliation Act of 1990, see Clark Blackman, How the New Tax Law Will
Affect Your Bottom Une, 13 AAll JOURNAL 25 (1991). State income tax rates, which vary
across states, have been ignored.
74 Treasury was quite aware of this possibility when it issued Rev. Rul83-51. In order
to for~l the possibility of greater tax arbitrage among entities with high and low marginal
tax rates, Treasury limited the ruling to home mortgage loans only.
75 This amounts to a deferral of interest.
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by the lender and deductible by the borrower as interest in the year the sale
occurs.
As the above discussion illustrates, the tax treatment of SAMs is
qualitatively different from that of the other deferred-payment mortgages. With
the SAM, both the lender's interest inclusions and borrower's interest
deductions from the shared-appreciation provision are deferred until payment.
There is, therefore, no mismatching of inclusions and deductions with a SAM.
Additionally, there are significant agency costs that occur with SAMs but
not with the other deferred-payment mortgages. Of all the deferred-payment
mortgages, the SAM is the only one for which the amount owed is a function
of a variable that is partially within the control of one of the parties: the value
of the house, which is affected by the mortgagor's actions. When a house is
mortgaged with a SAM, the mortgagee receives some of the upside if the
mortgagor improves the house, and pays some of the downside if the
mortgagor does not care for the house. As a result, the SAM reduces the
mortgagor's incentive to take care of the house and increases the mortgagee's
incentive to monitor the mortgagor's activities. 76 Due to these agency costs
SAMs are rarely used as mortgages on home residences, except for loans
among family members.77 Accordingly, the rest of this Article will focus on
deferred-payment mortgages other than the SAM.
\

IV. REFINANCING
The discussions above and below presume that the mortgagor has a single
deferred-payment mortgage. As the above section has shown, the tax cost of
using a deferred-payment mortgage in conqection with a personal residence
derives from the personal use exception, whiCh defers the deduction on accrued
interest (negative amortization) until it is paid. In this section, I consider the
possibility of reducing the tax cost of deferred-payment mortgages through a
technique using two or more mortgages.
A homeowner desirous of obtaining a deferred-payment mortgage but not
wishing to incur the tax cost of such a mortgage might try the following: take a
deferred-payment first mortgage on the house and establish a line of credit on
the house with a second mortgage from another lender. Whenever there would
be negative amortization on the first mortgage, the homeowner should draw on

76 These costs are not absent with other mortgages, but
smaller magnitude.

th1~y will

usually be of much

77 See Lewis Freiberg, The Problem with SAM: An Economic and Policy Analysis, 1
HOUSING FIN. REv. 73, 84 (1982). The effect is reinforced by various mortgagor protection
provisions, which increase the default risks borne by lenders.
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the line of credit and use that money to pay the negative amortizatilln 7 8
Economically, this would have the effect of substituting a first mortgage debt
for a second mortgage debt. However, from a tax perspective, the homeowner
would assert that she is paying all of her interest as it accrues and therefore can
take a current deduction for the interest on the first mortgage that she paid. 79
According to the taxpayer's argument, what is critical is that she has replaced
interest outstanding on a first mortgage with principal outstanding on a second
mortgage.
In the second month, the homeowner will repeat the process. She will pay
out-of-pocket, less than the full amount of interest, so she wiil take an
additional draw from the line secured by the second mortgage in order to pay
interest that would otherwise accrue on the first mortgage. The homeowner will
claim a current deduction and will economically have the same amount of debt
outstanding. This process will continue as long as the interest accruing on the
first mortgage exceeds the payment on the homeowner's deferred-payment
plan. Once the out-of-pocket payment exceeds the interest accruing on the first
mortgage (plus any required repayment of principal), the homeowner will use
the difference to reduce the second mortgage. The process will continue until
the two mortgages are retired.
If the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction is respected, she can
substantially reduce the tax cost of using 'deferred-payment mortgages. She will
not, however, eliminate it. The source of this tax cost is the interest accruing
on the second mortgage. This interest is not paid as it accrues, and is therefore
not currently deductible, if at all. From the perspective of the first mortgage,
the interest that is not currently deductible is only the accrued interest on the
accrued interest. The taxpayer benefits from the transaction because she can
currently deduct the accrued interest, only having to defer a deduction for the
interest that accrues on the accrued interest. 80
The existing authority supports the view that a current deduction will be
allowed for interest paid on a first mortgage when the taxpayer takes a second

78 The equity for this line of credit would come from rising nominal house prices. If
there is a fall in the real price of housing, there might not be enough equity.
79 The proposed PLAM regulations make clear that the second mortgage would not be
treated as acquisition indebtedness. Treas. Reg.§ 1.163-llT(c) (1990). Alternatively, if the
second mortgage were so treated, perhaps because the authorities integrated the two
mortgages, the interest on the first mortgage would not be considered paid.
80 Even this tax disadvantage can be eliminated by incurring a third-mortgage debt and
using the proceeds to pay the interest on the second mortgage. Subject only to the $100,000
limit 9n home equity indebtedness, in theory, the entire cost of a deferred-payment
mortgage can be eliminated through a series of mortgages. However, because of the
transaction costs of establishing numerous lines of credit, the discussion is limited to the case
of two mortgages.
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mortgage from a different lender. Thus, the homeowner should use a lender
other than the first mortgagee for the second mortgage because a taxpayer
cannot take a deduction for interest pai.d when the interest is paid with a loan
from the original lender. 8l
The existing authority on when interest is paid deal overwhelmingly with
one-shot transactions: the taxpayer takes out a loan and uses all or a portion of
the proceeds to pay interest on a prior loan. In contrast, the arrangement
contemplated here might last for many years, with a homeowner regularly
drawing on a line of credit for perhaps a decade or longer in order to pay
interest on a first mortgage. Moreover, in order for taxpayers without
substantial outside assets-those most likely to suffer from the tilt problem-to
use this multiple-mortgage technique, there will have to be restrictions on the
credit line secured by the second mortgage. To ensure that the total costs,
including default costs, are not increased, the borrower's ability to draw on the
credit line will have to be restricted; the right to draw must be limited so that
the sum of the_ outstanding balances on the two mortgages is no greater than
that which would be outstanding on a single deferred-payment mortgage
without making additional interest payments. For to do otherwise, would likely
substantially increase the default costs.
Because of the long term of the arrangement and the restrictions necessary
on the second mortgage to keep default costs down, whether the tax authorities
would treat as "paid" the interest accruing on the first mortgage to the extent of
the increase in the outstanding balance of the second mortgage is uncertain.
The dual-mortgage technique raises a more difficult question than the usual
one-shot transaction. I could find only one similar matter, and in that the
deduction was permitted. Private Letter Ruling 8425005 approved a current
deduction by a farmer when interest paid by a state through a farm support
program created a liability of the farmer to the state to repay the loan.
However, private letter rulings cannot be relied on by taxpayers besides the
requesting party. 82
There is a long history of tax avoidance transactions that are tied to the
interest deduction and the Internal Revenue Service has a number of weapons

8l Battlestein v. IRS, 631 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cit. 1980) (en bane), cen. tkrried, 451
U.S. 938 (1981); see also Franklin v. Comm'r, 683 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cit. 1982) (current
deduction denied taxpayer for interest paid to lender using funds borrowed from same
lender but allowed for interest paid to other lenders having participation interests in same
loan). If, however, the borrowed funds were commingled with the taxpayer's other funds,
and tl!e lender did not have control over the funds, the deduction might be allowed when
there was only one lender. Burgess v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 47 (1947). Contra Wilkerson v.
Comm'r, 655 F.2d 980,983 (9th Cit. 1981).
82 See Rev. Proc. 88-1, 1988-li.R.B. 7.
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available that it could use to challenge the taxpayer's characterization.8 3
Although by no means an easy case for the Service to win, one weapon would
be Goldstein v. Commissioner, 84 in which the Second Circuit denied a taxpayer
a deduction for interest paid on a debt because the tnmsaction was designed
solely for tax reasons: Goldstein, having had the good fortune 1 win the Irish
Sweepstakes, tried her hand at overcoming the progressive income tax. She
borrowed $945,000 from two banks to finance $1 million of Treasury
securities, and paid over most of the rest of her earnings to the banks as
prepaid interest. The goal was to spread out over a number of years, and
therefore at lower rates, her winnings from the sweepstakes. The court
disallowed the taxpayer's interest deductions holding that the debt was incurred
solely for the purpose of securing the deduction. A similar argument could be
made with respect to the two mortgage plans described above, because the sole
reason for taking the second mortgage is to accelerate interest deductions
without changing either the taxpayer's out-of-pocket payments or outstanding
indebtedness.
Given the amounts involved and the long term, it is really a matter of
policy for the tax authorities to decide when the interest is paid using the dualmortgage technique. Because it is not 'clear what policy would be adopted, the
simulation results presented in the next section calculate the tax costs both
without refinancing and assuming that refinancing is respected for tax purposes.
Obviously, the tax costs associated with deferred-payment mortgages could be
reduced, perhaps substantially, if the multiple-mortgage technique were
approved.
V. CALCULATION OFTI AX COST

This section presents the results of simulation studies conducted to estimate
the tax cost associated with various deferred-payment mortgages other than the
SAM. This tax cost can be seen as a cost of eliminating or reducing the tilt
problem when there is a mismatching of lender's inclusions and borrower's
deductions. In general, the more interest that is deferred and the longer the
period of deferral, the greater is the tax cost from using a deferred-payment
mortgage. The main result of the simulations is that the cost of eliminating the

83. Because of the variety of tax-avoidance transactions, it is difficult to generalize

about what is and what is not a prohibited tax avoidance scheme. See BoRIS I. BTITKER &
MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDJVD>UALS , 18.3 (1988).
84 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cen. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Sheldon v.
Comm'r, 94 T.C. 738 (1990), is a recent application of Goldstein.
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tilt problem is substantial for moderate levels of inflation, and it increases
rapidly with the rate of inflation. 85
Consider, for example, a mortgagor with a 30-year PLAM at 4% calling
for month! y payments, and who has a marginal tax rate of 28%. 86 One way to
measure the tax cost is by the increase in the real, after-tax internal rate of
return ("IRR") of the payments on the PLAM to the borrower over the
payments on an identical PLAM assuming that the borrower pays all of the
interest as it accrues. Using this method, 87 Table 1 shows that the tax cost of
using a PLAM to eliminate the tilt problem, when the house and mortgage are
kept until the loan matures, is less than 5 basis points if annual inflation is less
than 3%, around 15 points if inflation is 4%, 31 points with 5% inflation and
50 points with 6% inflation. The tax cost jumps to 94 basis points with
inflation at 8% and it soars to 144 points with inflation at 10%. 88 Measured in
terms of an increase in the net present value of the after-tax payments, the cost
is less than 1% with 3% inflation, around 2% when inflation is 4%, 4.5% at
5% inflation, and 7.5% at 6% inflation, 15% with inflation at 8%, and 24%
when inflation reaches 10%. 89 In other words, when inflation is 10%, the

85 The results of my analysis differ from those presented by Terrence Clauretie and
John Marts, who find that depending on the borrower's tax rate and the length of time the
mortgage is outstanding, there can be a tax advantage or disadvantage from using a
deferred-payment mortgage. Clauretie & Marts, supra note 10, at 73. According to my
analysis, there is never a tax advantage from deferral.
86 The reported tax costs are an increasing function of the mortgagor's marginal
income tax rate, taking into account both federal and state income taxes. Because most
homeowners have a combined. marginal tax rate above 28%, the simulations generally
underestimate the tax cost.
87 Calculations are made assuming that taxes are paid (and thus the benefits of
deductions are received) monthly instead of yearly. This has the elfect of increasing the tax
cost. The rationale for this convention, besides computational tractability, is that taxes are
actually paid as they are withheld from wages or as quarterly estimated tax payments are
made and not when annual returns are filed. A basis point is one one-hundredth of 1%.
88 The real, after-tax rate of interest on a PLAM with a given stated real interest rate is
a declining function of the inflation rate. This is because inflation compensation is treated as
interest, not as a return of principal. Thus, if the marginal tax rat:e for lenders is positive,
the market-determined stated real interest rate might be an increa'ling function of expected
inflation. The higher the stated real interest rate, and therefore the higher the after-tax rate
of interest for borrowers, the greater the tax cost of PLAMs. This is because the reduction
in the present value of deferred tax deductions is greater, the higher the discount rate.
Accordingly, if the stated real interest rates on PLAMs were an increasing function of
anticipated inflation, the tax cost ofPLAMs would be even higher than as given above.
89 The increase in the present value of after-tax payments is larger than an equivalent
payment in the form of loan points because loan points are usually deductible when paid and
therefore generate an immediate tax benefit to the borrower. Thl~ increase in the present
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present value of the after-tax payments on a $100,000 PLAM at 4% equals the
present value of the after-tax payments on either a $124,000 FRM at 14% or a
$124,000 PLAM at 4% on which no unpaid interest is allowed to accrue. 90
As Table 1 demonstrates, the tax cost of the personal use exception to a
borrower with a PLAM is an accelerating function of the long-term rate of
inflation. This acceleration is due to the regular compounding of interest.
Because of the compounding effect, the account of suspended interest increases
more than linearly as inflation increases. In addition, because the payment is a
linearly increasing function of inflation, it takes longer to retire the suspended
interest the higher the inflation rate, which further reduces the present value of
the deduction. These two effects combine to produce the result that the cost of
eliminating the tilt is an accelerating function of the long-term rate of inflation.
Not surprisingly, the tax cost of using a deferred-payment mortgage
increases with the holding period. Thus, the tax cost is reduced when the
mortgage is repaid early, or alternatively when the accrued OlD is paid and
thereafter all 01)) is paid as it accrues. 91 The increase in the tax cost from
maintaining the mortgage for an additional year is just the present value of
receiving the deduction from the accrued interest one year later. Accordingly,
the incremental tax cost to the borrower from a PLAM rises and falls with the
amount of accrued OlD. This implies, as shown in Table 2, that the tax cost to
the borrower of keeping the mortgage outstanding an additional year is higher,.
the higher the long-term rate of inflation. -In addition, as Table 2 shows, the
share of the ultimate tax cost of holding the mortgage to maturity that can be
avoided by repaying the mortgage in any given year is higher, the higher the
long-term inflation rate.
Because a taxpayer is permitted to deduct the negative amortization on a
home mortgage loan when she sells her house, even if she buys another house
and takes out a new loan,-the tax cost of deferred-payment mortgages is lower
for taxpayers who expect to sell their homes frequently. 92 Moreover, because
value of the after-tax payments does not generate a similar tax benefit because the impact of
tax considerations is taken into account in its calculation.
90 As of August 1992, 30-year FRMs were available at around 8%, the 1-year rate on
an ARM (taking out the teaser rate) was around 5% and inflation was running at around 2%
annually. This suggests an inflation premium for the 30-year FRM of around 5%. This
implies that the initial payment on a PLAM would be about 60% of that on a FRM and that
the anticipated after-tax cost of the deferred deductions with a PLAM would be about $4500
for each $100,000 borrowed.
91 There is an important caveat. For this result to hold, the taxpayer must be able to
use the entire deduction in the current year. There is no provision to carryover the
deduction to another tax year if the taxpayer cannot currently use the entire interest
deduc~on. The possibility of not being able to use the full interest deduction increases the
potential tax costs of using deferred-payment mortgages.
92 The same caveat applie.o;. This is true only if the full deduction can be used at the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate in the year the house is sold.
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the negative amortization on a loan cannot be deducted when a loan is
retinanced, tax considerations encourage borrowers with deferred-payment
mortgages to buy and sell homes more often. As Table 2 shows, the reduction
in the tax cost to a borrower with a PLAM from shorter holding periods is
relatively larger for higher inflation rates. Accordingly, if anticipated inflation
is high, taxpayers should pay close attention to how long they plan to keep a
house if they are considering using a deferred-payment mortgage. Indeed, most
mortgages are not kept 30 years. Ten years is closer to the norm. The tax cost
of a PLAM when the house is sold after 10 years, assuming that the full value
of the deduction can be realized, is 0.46% of the present value of the after-tax
payments with 3% inflation, 2.75% with 6% inflation, 4.86% with 8%
int1ation, and 7.41% with 10% inflation.
An alternative way of reducing the tax cost to the borrower using a
deferred-payment mortgage is for the borrower to increase her payments,
thereby reducing the interest that accrues. Table 3 shows the tax cost of
CPFVRMs using different payout rates. Table 3 is constructed on the
assumption that the real rate of interest for home mortgage loans is 4% and the
Fisher Effect holds. Accordingly, the real value of the payments on a 4%
CPFVRM is constant over time. With higher payout rates, the real value of the
payments falls over time, and the rate of decline is higher, the higher the
payout rate. As shown in Table 3, a higher payout rate increases the size of the
first payment, but lowers the tax cost. Once again, the cost of eliminating some
of the tilt is much less than the cost of eliminating it entirely. This suggests,
given the current tax law, that some homeowners might be willing to pay the
tax cost of eliminating part of the tilt, but not all of it. 93
Although fully eliminating the tilt in mortgage payments can be quite
expensive, the tax cost associated with the various GPM plans is modest. This
is illustrated in Table 4. Of the five GPM plans, the tax costs are highest for
Plans m and V. However, the tax cost associated with using either of these
plans would be less than $500 on a $100,000 mortgage, with an annual interest
rate of 10%. The corresponding cost of using a CPFVRM with a 4% payout
rate would be nearly $7500. Although the tax cost associated with the GPM is
much lower than that associated with the CPFVRM, the latter has a much
lower initial payment ($479) than do either of the GPMs ($667 for Plan ill and

I
i

l
I
!

93 Arthur Houston and William Scott have described a family of mortgage instruments,
which they call hybrid PLAMs, that permit the borrower and lender to simultaneously and
independently set the degree of payment tilt and allocate the inflation risk. William H/•SCOtt~
Jr., and Arthur L. Houston, Jr., lriflalion, Risk, Payment Tut, and the Design of Partiallylndexid ldfordable Mortgages, unpublished manuscript (1992). The increasing cost of
reducing more of the payment tilt suggests that homeowners might be interested in these
instruments.
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$735 for Plan V). Thus, the reason why the tax cost associated with the GPM
is so modest is that it eliminates only a small portion of the tilt.
_The simulation studies described above were all conducted under the
assumption that the taxpayer used a single mortgage and did not attempt to pay
accrued interest through additional borrowing. As described in section III.C.. it
is uncertain whether taxpayers would be permitted a current deduction for the
interest paid through additional borrowing. If a current deduction were not
permitted, then Tables 1 through 4 simulate the tax cost of using deferredpayment mortgages. If, however, such a deduction were allowed, then the tax
costs associated with deferred-payment mortgages could be less than those
indicated by Tables 1 through 4. This is demonstrated in Table 5, which
reworks Table 1.
Table 5 is constructed assuming an initial 4% PLAM of $300,000 and a
second PLAM that is used to pay the accrued but unpaid interest on the first
PLAM. Because of the $100,000 limit on home equity indebtedness, the tax
cost of using a deferred-payment mortgage (expressed as a percentage of the
original mortgage balance) is a function of the original mortgage balance.
Accordingly, the results in the far right column of Table 5 strictly apply only to
$300,000 PLAMs. The second column is calculated assuming that there is no
limit on home equity indebtedness. A comparison of the second and third
columns indicates that the tax costs are identiCal if the balance on the second
mortgage never reaches $100,000. Thus, for inflation rates of 6% or less,
column the second will apply to all PLAMs for less than $300,000.94
Table 5 demonstrates that the tax cost to some homeowners of using
deferred-payment mortgages might be substantially reduced if mortgagors
borrowed, using second mortgages, the funds needed to pay accrued interest on
their first mortgages. The reduction is greatest if the inflation rate is low and if
the $100,000 limit on home equity indebtedness is not reached. 9S However, if

94 With a $300,000 first mortgage, the second mortgage balance reaches a maximum
above $100,000; thus, the limit on home equity indebtedness binds, when inflation is above
6%. With an initial mortgage balance of $100,000, the limitation on home equity
indebtedness starts to have an effect when inflation is around 7%. With 10% inflation, the
initial mortgage balance has to be about $40,000 for the limit on home equity indebtedness
not to be reached.
95 The actual cost can probably be further reduced. Table 5 assumed there were two
mortgages-the initial mortgage and a second mortgage that was used to pay accrued but
unpaid interest on the first mortgage. If borrowing from one lender to pay interest due
another will generate a deduction, then the homeowner could further reduce the tax cost of
usiBg deferred-payment mortgages by taking out a third mortgage to pay the accrued but
unpaid interest on the second mortgage. Whether this would be worthwhile would depend
on the relative size of the tax savings and the transactions costs of an additional mortgage
loan. See supra part m.c.
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the $100,000 limit is substantially exceeded, then the reduction in the tax cost
is modest.9 6 Thus, the multiple-mortgage borrowing technique, if respected,
would not substantially benefit all taxpayers under all inflationary scenarios.

VI.

CHANGING THE

TAX LAW

Proponents of deferred-payment mortgages emphasize the improved
correlation between mortgage payments and income that these instruments
make possible and argue that this improved correlation will make
homeownership easier to achieve for those families squeezed out by the tilt
problem. Pointing to the FRM, which was designed in a low-inflation era with
the purpose of spreading the burden of buying a house evenly over a long time,
supporters argue that in an era of even moderate inflation deferred-payment
mortgages are needed to smooth out the burden. Proponents of deferredpayment mortgages are especially critical of ARMs without payment caps,
which they view as far more dangerous than deferred-payment mortgages.
These ARMs can produce payment shock, a sharp jump in the monthly
payment when the interest rate rises in response to an expectation that inflation
will increase. 97 This payment shock can be devastating for a family on a tight
budget. 98
The critics of deferred-payment mortgages focus on default risk. They
begin by noting that if lenders employed their current underwriting standards,
the default risk on deferred-payment mortgages would be higher than that on
traditional mortgages. Such an increase in defaults, even though the
homeowners presumably knew what they were getting into, would be
disastrous. They argue that the prospect of even more families being thrown
out of their homes in foreclosure proceedings is politically and morally

96 It is possible for the tax cost to be increased through the two-mortgage financing
technique. This can occur when the second mortgage greatly exceeds $100,000, the point
after which interest on any increase in the outstanding balance of the second mortgage is
disallowed. However, in such a case, the technique would not be used.
97 Although most ARMs have annual interest rate caps that prevent the interest rate
from rising more than 2 or 3 points at a time, interest-rate capped-ARMs can still produce
substantial payment shock as seen in the following example. Suppose that an increase in
expected inflation from 4 to 6% boosts the interest rate on an ARM from 7 to 9%. On a
$100,000, 30-year ARM this would produce a 21% jump in the monthly payment from
$665 to $&04.- Even assuming an immediate 6% rise in income to keep up with inflation, the
income increase is less than one-third of the payment increase. This example comes from
Woodward & Crowe, supra note 10, at 3.
98- The advocates of deferred-payment mortgages do not see the FRM as a pa.nat"..ea.
Not only is there the tilt problem, but borrowers have to pay a premium with FRMs to
compensate lenders against the risk of interest rates rising.
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unacceptable. Alternatively, if underwriting standards were tightened, keeping
the default risk in check, potential homebuyers would have to come up with
larger downpayments. This, the critics argue, many families would be unable
do. Those purchasers who can afford a house with a traditional mortgage but
could not come up with a larger downpayment would be either closed out of
the market or forced to purchase less housing with deferred-payment
mortgages. 99
It is generally agreed that to prevent a sharp increase in the number of
defaults, deferred-payment mortgages will use tighter underwriting standards
than traditional mortgages. 100 This might, although it will not necessarily,
require larger downpayments but lower incomes to purchase equivalent
housing. It is possible to tighten underwriting standards by lowering the
payment-to-income ratio without increasing the loan-to-value ratio. Because the
early year payments on the deferred-payment mortgage are smaller than those
on the corresponding FRM or ARM, this will have the dual advantages of
reducing the likelihood of default while reducing the minimum income required
to purchase the house. 101 However, even if the market-determined
underwriting standards require larger downpayments, deferred-payment
mortgages would still be useful for those potential homeowners who can make
the larger downpayments and afford more expensive houses. Although those
who could not make larger downpayments would not benefit from the
introduction of deferred-payment mortgages, they would not be harmed either,
as long as traditional mortgages were still available. 102
The proposal advanced in this Article is to reform the tax treatment of
deterred-payment mortgages, not to eliminate traditional mortgages from the
marketplace and replace them with deferred-payment mortgages. Such a reform
will put the two kinds of mortgages on a par, elhninate the tax advantages from
choosing one over the other~ and allow homeowners to select whichever is best
for them financially.
The effect of such a change on the demand for deferred-payment mortgages
and the subsidy to homeowners would depend on the reasons for consumers'

io

99 See Edelstein, supra note 9, at 444-45.

100 For example, HUD's proposed regulation for insuring PLAMs would have
established a maximum payment-to-income ratio of 20%, as opposed to 29% for FRMs,
and a maximum loan-to-value ratio below the 97% used for FRMs. See Woodward &
Crowe, supra note 10, at 5.
101 J. Huston McCulloch suggests that PLAMs be underwritten using a 20%
downpayment and a 20% payment-to-income ratio. He argues that such. PLAMs would be
. safer th~ traditional mortgages while allowing buyers to afford more expensive houses.
McCulloch, supra note 69, at 4, 5.
102 More accurately, any harm would be indirect. They are harmed to the extent that
c~mpetition with more buyers raises prices.

1372

OHIO STA1E LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1341

resistance to these mortgages. There are three groups of consumers classified
according to the reasons why they would or would not use deferred-payment
mortgages if they were available. The first group would not use these
mortgages, even if they were available, because of their tax cost. For these
consumers, eliminating the tax disadvantage could produce a significant
improvement in welfare by pennitting them· to improve their consumption
pattern over time. 103 It would not, however, increase a homeowner's tax
subsidy if she merely replaced a traditional mortgage with a deferred-payment
mortgage.I04 However, to the extent that new purchasers are brought into the
market or existing purchasers decide to purchase more expensive houses, there
will be an increase in the tax subsidy.
A second group of consumers would use deferred-payment mortgages,
even with the tax disadvantage, if they were availabl~. 1 05 For these consumers,
eliminating the tax disadvantage would result in an increase in the tax subsidy.
A third group of consumers do not like these mortgages for non-tax
reasons. For instance, if larger downpayments were required with deferredpayment mortgages, then those potential homeowners who could not come up
with larger downpayments would not be induced to use deferred-payment
mortgages by eliminating the tax disadvantage.
Evidence on the relative importance of the income and downpayment
constraints is limited. What evidence there is suggests that the downpayment

103 How such a benefit would be split between current and future homeowners
depends on how much of the benefit were capitalized into the price of land and existing
structures. If the benefit were fully capitalized, wbich would occur only if there were no
increase in housing supply, then existing homeowners would get the entire benefit of the
change in law. Those who did not currently own a house, the intended beneficiaries, would
receive no benefit. The supply of owner-occupied housing is probably elastic because rental
housing can be converted to owner-occupied housing, suggesting that purchasers will get
much of the benefit.
I 04 It could be argued that such a rule would encourage tax arbitrage, further
increasing the tax subsidy. By taking the money that would otherwise be used to pay the
mortgage and purchasing tax-deferred or tax-exempt investments, the homeowner is
effectively using tax-deductible borrowings to generate tax-deferred income. A simple
means of eliminating this double benefit is to deny any taxpayer with a deferred-payment
home mortgage the deduction for accrued but unpaid OlD on that portion of her mortgage
that can be offset by tax-favored investments such as municipal bonds. For an argument that
under certain circumstances arbitragers will not realize a double benefit so there is no need
for such a reastirction, see Alan Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in
UNEASY CoMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OP A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX (Henry Aaron
et al. eds., 1988).
~05 One possible reason why these mortgages might not be available in the United
States is because they have not yet been adequately promoted. This argument is made by
Susan Woodward and David Crowe for PLAMs. Woodward & Crowe, supra note 10, at 7.
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constraint prevents more potential homeowners from purchasing their first
house than does the income constraint. However, many find the income
constraint to be more restrictive. Thus, there is good reason to believe that
eliminating the tax disadvantage would significantly increase homeownership.I06
It might be suggested that the tax disadvantage with deferred-payment
mortgages should not be eliminated because this would amount to increasing
the already excessive subsidy to housing. Even granting the premise that the
subsidy to homeownership should not be increased, it does not follow that the
tax disadvantage should not be eliminated. The existing tax law has several
harmful effects. It is wasteful because it encourages excessive trading up. It is
also unfair because it discriminates against those without a lot of liquid
assets.I07 There are more efficient and fair methods of reducing the subsidy to
homeownership, such as allowing a deduction for less than 100% of the
interest or reducing the caps on acquisition or home equity indebtedness, that
do not have the harmful effects that the existing regime has.
There are several ways that the tax law could be amended to eliminate the
tax disadvantage associated with deferred-payment mortgages. Among these,
the only means of eliminating the tax disadvantage without raising fundamental
tax policy issues is by repealing the personal use exception. This would benefit
those homeowners and potential homeowners adversely affected by the tilt
problem.

A. Elimination of the Personal Use Exception
A simple means of putting deferred-payment and traditional mortgages on
an equal footing is to accelerate the borrower's tax' deductions with the former
by eliminating the personal use exception. Eliminating the personal use
exception would permit homeowners to deduct interest on home mortgages as
the interest accrued, 108 thereby removing the tax disadvantage that arises from
the accrual of unpaid interest. Such action, however, would not amount to a
major change in the cash method of tax accounting. This is because the OID
rules already place all parties on the accrual method with respect to almost all

106 Peter Zorn, "'Mobility-Tenure Decisions and FiTUllldal Oedit: Do Mo11gage
Qualification Requirements Constrain Home Owners/lip?", 17 AREUEA Qournal of
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association) 1 (1989).
107 Those without liquid assets but a good incom~ suffer most from the tilt problem.
Those with liquid assets but a smaller earned income can compensate for the tilt by
liquidating a8sets, which those with few liquid assets but good earning potential cannot do
because they cannot draw on that potential.
108 Legislative action would be required to amend I.R.C. § 1275 (1986).
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debt transactions. Under the OlD rules, a cash method taxpayer accounts for
the interest on loans she receives and extends as it accrues.
The legislative history lacks any discussion of why the personal use
·exception was put into the law when the OlD rules were extended to cover debt
instruments issued by individuals. One commentator suggested that the reason
behind the enactment of the personal use exception is that the extension of the
OlD rules would provide a windfall to individuals, who are almost all on the
cash method, by allowing them to take deductions on the accrual method.l 09
Although individual issuers would be better off if they could deduct interest as
it accrues, why this would amount to a windfall is not clear because the OlD
rules place all taxpayers, both cash and accrual method (including the lender in
the same loan transaction), on the accrual method with respect to covered loan
transactions. The personal use exception carves out an exception from this
general principle under limited circumstances, the unintended and undesirable
effect of which is to make housing less affordable, especially for first-time
homebuyers.
An additional benefit from the repeal of the personal use exception is the
elimination of the problem with potentially unusable deductions when the
property is sold. 110 This was a major disadvantage with the current tax law's
treatment of deferred-payment mortgages, raising the tax cost of these
mortgages above the levels reported in the simulations. Repealing the personal
use exception will eliminate the build-up of deductions that can be taken only
when paid. This would be especially beneficial to those who sell their houses
when they are in financial distress or after retirement, both circumstances in
which the capacity for and the value to the borrower of the interest deductions
are likely to be small.
It might be argued that eliminating the personal use exception is
unnecessary if the multiple-mortgage technique is approved. This does not
follow because the multiple-mortgage technique reduces the tax cost of using
deferred-payment mortgages but does not eliminate it. Even if the multiplemortgage technique could eliminate the entire tax cost, it would be costly to
implement. The transaction costs incurred by the borrower in dealing with
multiple lenders are wasteful as each lender will need to learn about the
property and the mortgagor. A related argument is that the dual-mortgage
technique is preferable to eliminating the personal use exception because the
benefits of the dual-mortgage technique accrue primarily to lower and moderate
income taxpayers. 111 Although the simulation results suggest that the benefits

109 H.B. McCawley, The Measurement of Interest on Mortgage Indebtedness, 5 TAX
MGMT. REALEsT. J. 125 (1989).
·
1I 0 See supra note 91.
Ill This occurs because the second mortgage is treated as home equity indebtedness,
which has a $100,000 limit. See supra part ID.C.
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would primarily fall to less wealthy homeowners, in practice this is less clear.
Given the costs of setting up the arrangement and the sophisticated nature of
the technique, the benefits might not flow to the less wealthy, but to the
wealthy and financially sophisticated.
Another set of arguments in favor of maintaining the personal use
exception are based on the argument that deferred-payment mortgages should
be discouraged. Critics of deferred-payment mortgages argue that the use of
these mortgages should be discouraged because the default risk is too high.
Why this should be so is unclear: the risk might be lower. However, even
assuming that the market~etermined underwriting standards for deferredpayment mortgages are deemed to be too pennissive, the appropriate response
is to tighten the underwriting standards by regulation and not to discourage
borrowers from using these mortgages by reducing their tax benefits. Some
mortgagors have claimed that unscrupulous sellers and brokers have induced
them to purchase houses using graduated-payment mortgages without teiJing
the~ that their payments will rise. 112 However, fraud perpetrated on borrowers
is no reason to reduce the tax benefits of defrauded borrowers. Reducing the
tax benefits is not likely to help the borrowers.

B. Change Timing of Interest Accruals
A second method of eliminating the tax cost of deferred-payment
mortgages would be to defer lenders' interest inclusions. For example,
requiring that borrowers and lenders take account of interest on home
mortgages as the interest is paid could eliminate the tax cost of deferredpayment mortgages, even though borrowers would still find the present value
of their deductions reduced. The tax disadvantage colltd then be eliminated by
selling mortgages to high-bracket taxpayers, such as corporations and
individuals, who gain as much, if not more, by the deferral of income as
borrowers lose, and thus presumably would be willing to accept a lower
interest rate. Such a change, however, is very unlikely to occur because it
would create arbitrage possibilities. Arbitrageurs could buy deferred-payment
mortgages and pay for them by issuing debt that has characteristics similar to
the pool of mortgages they hold. In this case, an arbitrageur's interest
deductions would run ahead of its interest inclusions, producing a tax benefit.
Competition in the arbitrage market would tend to compete away the profit
through lower interest rates, and the ultimate effect would be to increase the tax
subsidy to homeownership. As compared with traditional mortgages, deferring

r 12 Doug- Bailey & Peter Canellos, New York Thrift Agrees to Suspend Boston
Foreclosures; Mass. Officials Orecking Possible Rlegalities, BosTON GLOBE., Mar. 11,
1992, at 73.
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the recognition of interest would provide deferred-payment mortgages with a
tax advantage. Accordingly, homeowners might select deferred-payment
mortgages even if on balance they favored traditional mortgages for non-tax
reasons.
Given the current relatively flat tax schedule and a corporate tax rate just
above the top individual tax rate, there would be only a slight advantage from
using a deferred-payment mortgage, even assuming that the entire tax benefit of
the deferral is passed on to borrowers. However, with a more progressive tax
schedule, there could be substantial benefits from deferral for taxpayers who
are not in the upper brackets. Although this would tend to equalize the tax
benefits across income levels, and so might be considered desirable, there are
more direct methods of equalizing the benefits, such as giving a tax credit
(instead of a deduction) for a fraction of the interest paid each year and
reducing the limits on acquisition and home equity indebtedness.
There would still be problems from changing the timing of interest accruals
on home mortgages. First, the proposal would not place traditional and
deferred-payment mortgages on a par. It would be attractive to eliminate the tax
disadvantage associated with deferred-payment mortgages, because of their
potential in improving housing affordability for homebuyers. No argument has
been offered for providing a greater benefit to deferred-payment mortgages
over traditional mortgages. Second, increasing the subsidy by channeling the
mortgage funds through arbitrageurs is an inefficient way of increasing the
home mortgage interest subsidy because of the transaction costs that are
incurred. Also, to the extent that arbitrage is imperfect, some of the economic
benefits will go to the most efficient arbitrageurs, who are unintended
beneficiaries. Third, requiring borrowers and lenders to account for interest on
home mortgages as the interest is paid doe8 not ameliorate the problem of
borrowers being unable to use all of their deductions when they sell their
houses. Fourth, changing the timing of interest accruals is likely to produce
further confusion in an already confused and complicated area of the law, the
taxation of hybrid debt instruments, because the timing of the interest accruals
on an instrument will depend on the nature of the instrument, whether it is a
home mortgage or not. Although the first two of these problems might not be
severe, given the current flat tax schedule, they could become acute if a more
progressive tax schedule is adopted once again. Because eliminating the
personal use exception effectively remedies the tilt problem without creating
new problems, it is preferred to putting the parties to a home mortgage loan on
the cash method for the Joan.

C. ElimifJtltion of Home Mortgage Deduction

·A third, although imprecise. method of removing the tax disadvantage is to
eliminate the deduction for home mortgage interest. If home mortgage interest

1992)

MORTGAGE TAXATIO.\

1377

were not deductihle, then it would not matter when the borrower took account
of the interest for tax purposes because it would always be a nondeductible
expense. Accordingly, if the home mortgage deduction were eliminated,
deferred-payment mortgages would no longer suffer a tax disadvantage.IIJ
Whether this would have a significant impact on the use of deferred-payment
mortgages depends on how significant an impediment the tax disadvantage is to
the use of these mortgages.114
The question of whether there should be a home mortgage deduction has
been hotly debated for many years, and a detailed discussion of the merits of
such a change to the tax system is beyond the scope of this Article.115

113 Indeed, in this case, the SAM could produce a substantial tax advantage. If the
home mortgage deduction were eliminated but the current tax treatment of lenders was
maintained, SAMs would be an attractive means for lenders to defer tax. Competition
among lenders could then be expected to tend to pass this advantage on to borrowers
through lower interest rates.
11 4 Indexing the tax system for inflation would also eliminate the tax disadvantage
from deferred-payment mortgages. This would taise even more fundamental questions of
tax policy.
115 Although the home interest deduction has lol}g been considered a sacred political
cow, that might be changing as attention is increasingly focused on the national deficit and
poverty issues. See Jacqueline Salmon, Mortgage TtzK Break: 1ime to Pare it Down?,
WASH. PosT, May 17, 1992, at Hl. Those who favor the deduction, often claim that
homeownership is a fundamental part of the American dream that the federal government
has a duty to support. 131 Cong. Rec. S5238 (daily ed. May 2, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Bentsen). Furthermore, they argue that the mortgage ipterest deduction keeps housing
affordable. Crane Urges Lawmakers to Save Home Mortgage Deduction, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Sept. 27, 1990, at 199-SS:Beyond economics, proponents of the home mortgage
interest deduction claim that a house is more than an investment, it is a home. More than
Just a House, BosTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 1990, at A24. Moreover, homeownership promotes
social and economic benefits for the family, the surrounding community and other goals,
such as education. Rosty Blocks Two Bartlett Amendments to Housing Bill, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 9, 1990, at 165-61. On the other side, although the deduction is intended to
increase homeownership, the benefits of the deduction overwhelmingly flow to the wealthy.
According to the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, of the 24.1 million taxpayers
who claimed the home mortgage interest deduction in 1991, households with adjusted gross
incomes of more than $100,000 received 30% of the benefits. More than half of the benefits
went to households whose income exceeds $75,000, while households with income below
$40,000 received less than 10% of the benefits. See Salmon, supra. To remedy the
imbalance and raise government revenues, many advocate greater limitations on the home
mortgage deduction. The proposed changes are gaining support across party lines. Some
Republicans favor the change as an implicit tax increase that will cut the deficit, whereas
so~e Deinoorats support the change because it would equalize the benefits from the
deduction across income groups. See Salmon, supra. The proposal is also well liked by
economists who view the mortgage interest deduction as distorting the economy by moving
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Obviously, the elimination of the home mortgage deduction would have large
wealth and incer.tive effects throughout the economy, and putting deferredpayment and traditional mortgages on an equal tax footing would be among the
least significant of these. Thus, suffice it to say, that if the home mortgage
deduction were eliminated, the tax disadvantage associated with deferredpayment mortgages would disappear.ll6

VII. CONCLUSION
Homeownership is a cherished part of the American dream. In addition,
because homeowners usually have a greater stake in their community than do
renters, many observers believe that wider homeownership is a means of
improving social condition.s. 117 Unfortunately, inflation has prevented many
Americans from becoming homeowners. Traditional mortgages, such as the
FRM and the ARM, coupled with inflation have produced the tilt problem,
increasing the _ burden of early mortgage payments, which has put
homeownership out of reach for many Americans. Fortunately, there is a
solution. Creative mortgage instruments, such as the GPM, CPFVRM and
PLAM, can smooth out the real burden of the mortgage payments. However,
these instruments, which in order to eliminate the tilt produce negative
amortization, are treated disfavorably under the existing tax law by virtue of
the personal use exception. Moreover, the tax cost of eliminating the tilt by
using a deferred-payment mortgage is substantial when inflation is moderate, as
it has been for several years, and it rises rapidly with inflation. Congress
should, therefore, repeal the personal use exception, which would eliminate the
tax disadvantage associated with deferred-payment mortgages, thereby placing
traditional and deferred-payment mortgages ob par and making homeownership
more affordable for those Americans squeezed by inflation.

resources towards housing and away from industry. Norton, What Ought to be Done About
Taxes, FORTUNE, Mar. 25, 1992, at 99. Even so, support is not universal. Limiting or
eliminating the deduction would have a strong negative impact for housing and home prices,
increasing the number of defaults and foreclosures. See James Flanigan, Deficit-Fighters
Eye Mortgage Interest, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 25, 1990, at Dl. It would also hurt those
involved in the building trades, and might unfairly hurt those in high cost housing regions.
See Salmon, supra. Still others have questioned the distributional effects of eliminating the
deduction, arguing that the middle class would be hurt most because the rich have
alternative means of sheltering their income from tax. See More than Just a House, supra.
116 It is worth noting that PLAMs are used in several developed countries with
moderate levels of inflation, including Australia, Canada and Denmark. In none of these
three countries is a tax deduction allowed for home mortgage interest. However, in
Australia and Canada the government provides mortgage insurance and therefore, may
subsidize the default risk.
117 See Rosty Blocks Two Bartlett Amendments to Housing Bill, supra note 113.
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APPENDIX
Table I
TAX COST OF PERSONAL USE EXCEPTION WITH PLAMs
30-year PLAM at 4%
with monthly payments
28% marginal tax rate
Yearly
Inflation

0
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
10

Real After-Tax IRR
Interest Deductible
When
Paid
Accrued
Percent
2.88
2.88
2.3218
2.3209
2.0860
2.0421
1.9156
1.7637
1.7936
1.4858
1.7059
1.2084
1.6425
0.9314
1.5966
0.6548
1.5388
0.1031

Cost
IRR

Cost
NPV

Basis Points
0
0
0.09
0.01
4.39
0.63
15.18
2.21
30.78
4.53
49.75
7.43
71.11
10.80
94.18
14.59
143.57
23.58

Initial
Payment
Ratio
Percent
100
79.70
71.87
65.20
59.49
54.58
50.33
46.63
40.54

The initial payment ratio is the ratio of the first payment on the PLAM to the
first payment on the cOrresponding FRM, expressed as a percentage. The
interest rate on the corresponding FRM is 4% above annual inflation.
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Table 2
TAX COST OF PERSONAL USE EXCEPTION WITH PLAMs
30-year PLAM at 4%
with monthly payments
28% marginal tax rate
PLAM prepaid without penalty
End of Year
Repayment
Occurs
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
10
12
15
20
25
30

Cost as percentage increase in after tax NPV
for an annual inflation rate of
3%
6%
8%
10%
Percent
0.01
0.04
0.07
0.10
0.03
0.15
0.27
0.41
0.07
0.33
0.58
0.89
0.11
0.57
1.00
1.52
0.16
0.85
1.50
2.29
0.22
1.18
2.07
3.16
0.28
1.54
2.71
4.13
0.34
1.92
3.39
5.17
0.46
2.75
4.86
7.41
0.55
3.60
6.41
9.78
0.63
4.85
8.72
13.34
0.63
6.56
12.07
18.65
0.63
7.40
14.18
22.25
0.63
7.43
14.59
23.28
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Table 3
TAX COST OF PERSONAL USE EXCEPTION WITH CPFVRMs
30-year mortgage with monthly payments
nominal interest = 4% + inflation
28% marginal tax rate
Yearly
Inflation

0
2

3
4

5
6
7
8
10

4% Payout
Cost
Initial
NPV
Payment
Ratio
0
0.01
0.64
2.22
4.56
7.48
10.87
14.69
23.45

100
79.63
-71.76
65.06
59.33
54.40
50.13
46.41
40.29

6% Payout
Cost
Initial
NPV
Payment
Ratio
Percent
0
125.58
0
100
0
90.11
0.29
81.71
1.63
74.52
3.76
' 68.32
6.44
62.96
9.56
58.29
16.86
50.60

8% Payout
Cost
Initial
NPV
Payment
Ratio
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.87
2.70
5.10
11.06

153.70
122.38
110.29
100
91.22
83.61
77.05
71.34
61.93

The initial payment ratio is the ratio of the first payment on the CPFVRM to
the first payment on the corresponding FRM, expressed as a percentage.
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Table 4
TAX COST OF PERSONAL USE EXCEPTION WITH GPMs
30-year GPM
with monthly payments
28% marginal tax rate
Cost as percentage increase in after-tax NPV
GPM Plan
Pymt Inc.
(%)

I
2.5

II
5

III
7.5

IV
2

v

Grad. Prd.

5

5

5

10

10

3

Annual
Interest Rate
Percent
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14

0
0
0
0
0.01
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.26

0
0
0.02
0.06
0.13
0.22
0.33
0.47
0.79

0
0.03
0.09
0.18
0.31
0.47

0.66
0.88
1.36

0
0
0
0.01
0.07
0.16
0.29
0.43
0.74

'

0
0
0.04
0.13
0.28
0.47
0.68
0.91
1.39
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Table 5
TAX COST OF PERSONAL USE EXCEPTION WITH PLAMs
WHEN MORTGAGE REFINANCING PERMITTED
30-year PLAM at 4%
with monthly payments
28% marginal tax rate
accrued OlD paid using second mortgage
first mortgage loan of $300,000

Real After-Tax Increase in Cost of Payments
Yearly
Inflation

No Refinancing

No Limit on
Home Equity
Indebtedness
Percent

$100,000 Limit
on Home Equity
Indebtedness

0
2
3

0

0
0

0
0
0.22

4

5
6
7

8
10

0.08
1.39
3.84
7.14
11.14
15.75
20.91
32.79

0.22
0.93
2.17
3.90
6.12
8.78
15.41

0.93
2.17
3.90
11.27
16.88
29.54

Figure 1

The Tilt Problem
Dollars
900

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

800

FRM nominal payment
w/4'Yo anticipated inflation

700
600
500
400

FRM

nominal payment w/0% inflation

300

FAM real payment w/anticipated
and actual inflation at 4%

200
100

0 +-+-~~~~-+-+-+-+~~~+-+-~~~~-+-+-+-+-+~~~
$100K, 30-yr FRM at 4%

Figure 2

The Price-Level Adjusted Mortgage
Dollars

1200
1000
800
600
$477

400
200

· PLAM Real Payment

